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ABSTRACT 
Introduction. People who experience intrusive thoughts are at increased risk of developing 
hallucinatory experiences, as are people who have weak reality discrimination skills. No 
study has yet examined whether these two factors interact to make a person especially prone 
to hallucinatory experiences. The present study examined this question in a non-clinical 
sample. 
Methods. Participants were 160 students, who completed a reality discrimination task, as well 
as self-report measures of cannabis use, negative affect, intrusive thoughts, and auditory 
hallucination-proneness. The possibility of an interaction between reality discrimination 
performance and level of intrusive thoughts was assessed using multiple regression. 
Results. The number of reality discrimination errors and level of intrusive thoughts were 
independent predictors of hallucination-proneness. The reality discrimination errors × 
intrusive thoughts interaction term was significant, with participants who made many reality 
discrimination errors and reported high levels of intrusive thoughts being especially prone to 
hallucinatory experiences. 
Conclusions. Hallucinatory experiences are more likely to occur in people who report high 
levels of intrusive thoughts and have weak reality discrimination skills. If applicable to 
clinical samples, these findings suggest that improving patients’ reality discrimination skills 
and reducing the number of intrusive thoughts they experience may reduce the frequency of 
hallucinatory experiences. 
 
Keywords: reality discrimination; signal detection; intrusive thoughts; hallucination-
proneness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive models propose that auditory hallucinations (AH) occur when an internal 
mental event is misattributed to an external source (e.g., Bentall, 1990; Waters et al., 2013). It 
has been suggested that intrusive thoughts may be the mental events that are misattributed to 
become AH (Morrison, Haddock, & Tarrier, 1995). In part, this is because both intrusive 
thoughts and AH have been described as being unwanted, uncontrollable, and distressing 
(Rachman, 1978, 1981; Nayani & David, 1996). In addition, it has been argued (e.g., Bentall, 
2003) that the unbidden nature of intrusive thoughts means that they tend to lack features that 
suggest to a person that they were the author of that thought (i.e., they are not associated with 
any cognitive effort). Thus, intrusive thoughts are more likely to be attributed to an external 
source, and so be experienced as an AH. Empirical evidence is consistent with these claims. 
For example, studies with clinical populations have shown that patients who experience AH 
report more intrusive thoughts than do patients who do not experience AH (Lobban, 
Haddock, Kinderman, & Wells, 2002; Morrison & Baker, 2000). Meanwhile, studies with 
non-clinical participants have shown that participants who report high levels of intrusive 
thoughts also report high levels of AH-proneness (Jones & Fernyhough, 2006, 2009). There 
are, therefore, good theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that intrusive thoughts may 
be the ‘raw materials’ of AH. 
Another factor that appears to play a role in the development of AH is reality 
discrimination. Reality discrimination refers to the process by which a person distinguishes 
between internal, self-generated and external, other-generated events (Bentall, 1990). One 
way of assessing reality discrimination is through an auditory signal detection task (SDT). In 
such a task, participants must try to detect a signal (typically a small amount of speech) in an 
ambiguous auditory stimulus (typically white noise). On some trials the signal is present; on 
other trials the signal is absent. Reality discrimination errors occur when a participant makes 
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a false alarm – that is when they perceive speech to be present in the white noise when it is 
absent. Presumably, when a false alarm occurs, participants have mistaken their internal 
representation of the signal (the speech) for the external signal. A recent meta-analysis 
(Brookwell, Varese, & Bentall, 2013) has shown that psychotic participants who experience 
AH, and non-clinical participants who are prone to AH, have biased reality discrimination, so 
that they make more false alarms than do control participants when performing these tasks, 
suggesting that they have a tendency to misattribute internally-generated events to an external 
source.  
Bentall (2003) has argued that a person who experiences high levels of intrusive 
thoughts and has poor reality discrimination abilities should be especially prone to AH, as 
they will frequently experience cognitions that lack the characteristics of self-generated 
events, and they will be predisposed towards mistaking internal, self-generated events for 
external, other-generated events. No study has yet examined whether this is the case. 
Therefore, in the present study we examined this possibility by investigating, in an analogue 
sample, whether a combination of poor reality discrimination skills and intrusive thoughts 
placed a person at an especially high risk of AH. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were 160 university students (137 women), aged 18-38 years (M = 21.08, 
SD = 3.44), who received course credit or a small payment in return for their time. 
Participants had a good understanding of English, did not have a history of head injury of 
neurological problems, and did not have any hearing problems.  
Procedure 
The study was approved by a departmental ethics committee and was conducted in 
accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. After providing informed 
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consent, participants completed the signal detection task and a questionnaire battery, which 
included the measures below. 
Demographics. Participants provided their age, gender, ethnicity, and reported their 
perceptions of their parents’ income during childhood on a 5-item scale (1 = Much less than 
enough money to meet our needs; 5 = Much more than enough money to meet our needs; 
Teicher, Samson, Sheu, Polcari, & McGreenery, 2010).  
Intrusive thoughts. Participants’ susceptibility to intrusive thoughts was assessed 
using the 5-item intrusions subscale of the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Muris, 
Merckelbach, & Horselenberg, 1996; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). These five items describe 
various aspects of thought intrusions (e.g., “I have thoughts I cannot stop”) and participants 
indicate to what extent they agree with each statement on a 5-point scale (1 = Strongly 
disagree; 5 = Strongly agree). Thus, scores can range from 5–25, with higher scores 
reflecting a higher level of intrusive thoughts. The scale had good internal reliability (α = 
.84). 
AH-proneness. AH-proneness was assessed using the nine items from the Cardiff 
Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS; Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006) that assess unusual 
auditory experiences. These nine items ask whether participants have experienced various 
unusual auditory percepts (e.g., “Do you ever hear noises or sounds when there is nothing 
around to explain them?”). Participants rate how often they have had these experiences on a 
6-point scale (0 = Never; 5 = Happens all the time), so that scores can range from 0–45, with 
higher scores reflecting greater AH-proneness. The scale had good internal reliability (α = 
.81). 
Negative affect. Negative affect was assessed using items from the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This scale consists of words 
that describe negative affect (e.g., scared, irritable, distressed) and participants are asked to 
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indicate to what extent they generally feel each affective descriptor on a 5-point Likert scale 
(1 = Very slightly or not at all; 5 = Extremely). Scores on the negative affect subscale range 
from 10 to 50, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of negative affect. The scale had 
good internal reliability (α = .88). 
Cannabis use. Cannabis use was assessed using the revised Cannabis Use Disorders 
Identification Test (CUDIT-R; Adamson et al., 2010). Cannabis use is not a variable of 
central interest in this study, but should be controlled for, given the associations between 
cannabis use and hallucinatory experiences in non-clinical populations (Kelleher & Cannon, 
2011). For the present analysis, only data collected from the first item of the CUDIT-R was 
used. This item asks about the frequency of cannabis use over the past six months and 
participants respond on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = Never; 4 = Four or more times per week).  
Auditory signal detection task. To assess reality discrimination, participants 
completed the auditory signal detection task (SDT) described in Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, 
McKie, and Lewis (2007). This task consisted of 60 trials, with each trial consisting of a five 
second burst of white noise followed by three seconds of silence. In 34 of the bursts of white 
noise, one second of speech was presented. In the remaining 26 bursts of white noise, no 
speech was presented. In 12 of the trials when speech was presented, the speech was clearly 
audible. In the remaining 22 trials, the speech was presented at an auditory threshold. This 
threshold was determined prior to the start of testing by establishing the volume of speech 
that was perceived by 50% of a small sample (n = 10) of participants who were around the 
same age as the experimental participants. The task was presented to participants on a laptop 
computer, using the audio recording and playback software package Cakewalk 
(www.cakewalk.com). Stimuli were presented using standard Sony headphones. Participants 
were asked to decide whether or not speech had been presented in each burst of white noise, 
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and to respond via a button press during the three seconds of silence that followed the white 
noise.  
Following Barkus et al. (2011), the number of false alarms made (i.e., trials where 
participants had responded that the speech was present in the white noise when it was in fact 
absent) was used as our primary measure of reality discrimination. In addition, the number of 
hits a participant made (i.e., trials where a participant correctly responded that the speech was 
present in the white noise), d’ (or perceptual sensitivity; i.e., a participant’s ability to 
discriminate between trials where speech was present and trials where speech was absent), 
and non-parametric β (or response bias; i.e., a participant’s tendency, across all trials, to 
respond that speech was present in the white noise) were recorded. β and d’ were calculated 
using the formulae described in Barkus et al. (2007). The number of false alarms made could 
range from 0 to 26, with a larger number of false alarms indicating weaker reality 
discrimination. The number of hits made could range from 0 to 34. Non-parametric β could 
vary between -1 and 1, with negative values indicating a more liberal response bias (i.e., a 
bias towards responding that speech is present in the white noise) and positive values 
indicating a more conservative response bias (i.e., a bias towards responding that speech is 
not present in the white noise). d’ values of zero indicate an inability to discriminate between 
trials where speech is present and trials where speech is absent, with more positive values 
indicating a better ability to discriminate between trials where speech is present and trials 
where speech is absent. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses 
For all demographic variables, dichotomous groups were created. In terms of 
ethnicity, the sample was divided into those who reported being White British (n = 121), and 
those who reported belonging to another ethnic group (n = 39). In terms of perceived parental 
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income, participants were divided into one group who reported that their parents’ income was 
less than, or much less than enough to meet their needs (n = 18) and a second group who 
reported that their parents’ income was enough, more than enough, or much more than 
enough to meet their needs (n = 141; one participant did not report perceived parental 
income).  In terms of cannabis use, participants were divided into those who had used 
cannabis in the past six months (n = 131) and those who had not (n = 28; one participant did 
not report their cannabis use). Differences between these groups in terms of level AH-
proneness were not significant (all p-values > .18). Descriptive statistics for all variables are 
presented in Table 1. 
(Table_1_about_here) 
Correlational and multiple regression analyses 
Correlations between variables are also presented in Table 1. A Bonferroni correction 
was applied, meaning that a significance level of α’ = .008 was employed. Not all participants 
provided complete data. As a result, the size of N varies from 153 to 159 for the correlational 
analyses. Higher levels of negative affect, intrusive thoughts, more false alarms, more hits, 
lower values of β, and lower values of d’ were all associated with higher levels of AH-
proneness.  
A linear regression was conducted to identify independent predictors of AH-
proneness. As shown in Table 2, age, gender, ethnicity, perceived parental income, cannabis 
use, and negative affect were entered as predictors in the first block. In the second block, 
intrusive thoughts and number of false alarms were entered, with the intrusive thoughts × 
number of false alarms interaction term entered in the third block. Collinearity diagnostics for 
this regression were satisfactory (minimum tolerance = .72; average VIF = 1.22), and 
residuals appeared to be both independent and normally distributed. The initial model was 
significant, F(6, 146) = 5.45, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .15. In this model, only negative affect 
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was an independent predictor of AH-proneness. Inclusion of intrusive thoughts and number 
of false alarms improved the model, F(8, 144) = 11.55, p < .001, ∆R2 = .21. In this revised 
model, intrusive thoughts and number of false alarms were independent predictors of AH-
proneness. Inclusion of the interaction term also improved the model. F(9, 143) = 11.03, p < 
.001, ∆R2 = .02. In this revised model, intrusive thoughts, number of false alarms, and the 
interaction term were independent predictors of AH-proneness.  
(Table_2_about_here) 
To interpret the intrusive thoughts × number of false alarms interaction effect, 
ModGraph (Jose, 2013)—a programme that graphically displays interaction effects—was 
employed. As shown in Figure 1, when participants experienced low levels of intrusive 
thoughts, they were unlikely to be AH-prone. This was true for participants who made a low, 
moderate, or high number of false alarms. However, as participants reported more intrusive 
thoughts, good reality discrimination abilities were associated with a reduction in the risk that 
participants would be AH-prone. That is, participants who reported high levels of intrusive 
thoughts, but made few false alarms, were less likely to be AH-prone than were participants 
who experienced high levels of intrusive thoughts and made many false alarms. 
The above regression analysis was repeated using d’ and β, rather than number of 
false alarms, as measures of reality discrimination. The results of these additional analyses 
were similar to the original analysis. However, while β was an independent predictor of AH-
proneness (p = .017), d’ was an independent predictor of AH-proneness at a trend level only 
(p = .07), and while the intrusive thoughts × d’ interaction term was significant (p = .012), the 
intrusive thoughts × β interaction term was only significant at a trend level (p = .09). 
(Figure_1_about_here) 
DISCUSSION 
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The present study showed that high levels of intrusive thoughts and weak reality 
discrimination abilities are independent predictors of AH-proneness in non-clinical 
participants. Importantly, the present study also showed these two factors interact, so that 
people who report high levels of intrusive thoughts and have weak reality discrimination 
abilities are especially prone to AH. These findings are consistent with a number of previous 
studies and with current models of AH, as outlined below. 
The association between intrusive thoughts and AH-proneness reported here is 
consistent with findings from a number of other non-clinical studies (Jones & Fernyhough, 
2006, 2009). These findings from analogue studies are consistent with data from studies that 
have employed clinical samples, where patients who experience AH report more frequent 
intrusive thoughts than do patients who do not experience AH (e.g., Lobban et al., 2002; 
Morrison & Baker, 2000). Together, these studies provide support for the idea that intrusive 
thoughts may be the raw material of AH, as suggested by Morrison et al. (1995).  
The relation between reality discrimination problems and AH-proneness reported here 
is concordant with a number of analogue (e.g., Barkus et al., 2007) and clinical studies (e.g., 
Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2012), as well as a recent meta-analysis that synthesized this data 
(Brookwell et al., 2013). Together, these findings support the argument that people who 
experience AH tend to misattribute internal, self-generated events to an external, non-self 
source, a claim that is central to most models of AH (e.g., Bentall, 1990; Waters et al., 2013). 
In addition, the interaction effect reported here supports Bentall’s (2003) prediction that a 
person who experiences high levels of intrusive thoughts and who has weak reality 
discrimination skills will be at especially high risk of developing AH. This result extends 
current models of AH in important ways, by emphasizing that AH are most likely to occur 
when multiple risk factors are present, and by suggesting that, in the absence of intrusive 
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cognitions that can form the raw material of an AH, weak reality discrimination abilities may 
not elevate a person’s risk of experiencing AH.  
The present study suffered from a number of limitations. First, the data are cross-
sectional, meaning that the causal links between variables are difficult to interpret. Second, 
while the measure of AH-proneness employed here does not suffer from some of the 
weaknesses of other measures of hallucination-proneness (e.g., the lack of face validity of the 
subscales of Morrison, Wells, & Nothard’s (2000) Revised Launay-Slade Hallucination 
Scale, or the relatively low internal reliability of McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough’s, 2011, 
Revised Hallucination Scale), some of its psychometric properties (e.g., test-retest reliability) 
have not yet been established. Third, and most importantly, we have employed a non-clinical 
sample, and so it is unclear whether these findings will be helpful in understanding AH 
experienced by clinical populations (David, 2010). In a recent review, Badcock and Hugdahl 
(2012) outlined areas of continuity and discontinuity in the cognitive mechanisms thought to 
underlie AH in clinical and non-clinical groups. While they identify some apparently shared 
mechanisms (including the role of intrusive cognitions in both groups), Badcock and Hugdahl 
emphasize aspects of discontinuity (e.g., contextual binding seems to be weak in clinical, but 
not in non-clinical, groups). Badcock and Hugdahl, therefore, recommend that researchers 
adopt a more critical stance towards the continuum model of AH, and so should not assume 
that findings from analogue studies will be replicated in clinical populations. Consequently, 
one should be cautious and not assume that the present results can aid our understanding of 
AH in clinical groups. Research that examines the associations between intrusive thoughts, 
reality discrimination, and AH in a clinical sample is, thus, required.  
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive statistics for, and correlations between, measures of negative affect, intrusive thoughts, number of false alarms, number 
of hits, β, d’, and auditory hallucination-proneness 
Variable Mean SD Minimum – maximum 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Negative affect 20.02 6.81 10 – 40 .45* .22* .10 -.11 -.14 .41* 
2. Intrusive thoughts 16.15 4.59 5 – 25   .19 .09 -.12 -.15 .54* 
3. False alarms 4.36 4.32 0 – 25   .58* -.84* -.81* .38* 
4. Hits 19.82 4.49 12 – 32    -.62* -.05 .26* 
5. β 0.41 0.38 -0.39 to 1     .74* -.26* 
6. d’ 1.38 0.56 -0.20 to 3      -.25* 
7. Auditory hallucination-proneness 7.02 6.21 0 – 32       
 
*p < .008 
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TABLE 2  
Summary of hierarchical analysis for auditory hallucination-proneness 
Variable B SE B β β 
Block 1    
Age 0.01 0.01 .04 
Gender -0.48 1.43 -.03 
Ethnicity 1.47 1.16 .10 
Parental income -2.18 1.52 -.11 
Cannabis use -0.57 1.24 -.04 
Negative affect 0.38 0.07 .08*** 
    
Block 2    
Age 0.00 0.01 .02 
Gender -1.21 1.25 -.07 
Ethnicity 0.30 1.02 .02 
Parental income -1.51 1.36 -.08 
Cannabis use -0.04 1.08 .00 
Negative affect 0.14 0.07 .15 
Intrusive thoughts 0.57 0.10 .42*** 
False alarms 0.37 0.10 .25*** 
    
Block 3    
Age 0.00 0.01 .02 
Gender -1.13 1.23 -.06 
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Ethnicity -0.04 1.02 .00 
Parental income -1.48 1.34 -.07 
Cannabis use -0.05 1.07 .00 
Negative affect 0.13 0.07 .15 
Intrusive thoughts 0.60 0.10 .42*** 
False alarms 0.29 0.10 .25*** 
Intrusive thoughts × false alarms 0.04 0.02 .15* 
 
*p < .05, ***p < .001
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FIGURE 1 
Interaction between level of intrusive thoughts and number of false alarms made 
during a reality discrimination task. 
 
 
